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Argument
After trial, the findings made by the trial court were inadequate to justify the
legal conclusion that Appellant Bayles had been stalking Appellee Bailey. No effort
was made by Appellee Bailey to seek clarification of the findings or request a new
trial. Appellee Bailey did not argue to the Court of Appeals that an alternate
justification in fact or law merited affirmance of the trial court. Thus, many of the
situations when "affirm on any ground" or "equitable review" has been properly
applied do not apply in this case.
In addition, Appellee Bailey's arguments fail to demonstrate that while
affirming on alternate grounds the Court of Appeals provided to Appellant Bayles
either (1) the procedural protections afforded by Article I § 7 and the Fourteenth
Amendment tc the Unite~ 3tates1 Constitution, or (2) the substantive protections
required by the provisions of Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution. Having failed to
do both, the Court of Appeals' decision should be vacated and instructions given to
direct that the trial court opinion also be vacated.
I. Legal and Equitable Precedent Allowing Appellate Affirmance
Do Not Apply to This Case
The re-interpretation and re-application by the court of appeals of alleged facts
and argument presented to the trial court is not justified by standard legal doctrines
or practice. As such, the first three arguments presented by Appellee Bailey do not
have merit.
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A. Court of Appeals Affirmance Is Not Justified Under Existing Doctrines
Allowing for Legal and Equitable Affirmance on Any Grounds
Whether based on affirmance on any ground, re-finding of facts for equitable
reasons, or proper application of the existing precedent of Strollo v. Strollo.1 the
affirmance of the court of appeals is erroneous.
1. "Affirm on Any Ground" As A Matter of Law
The doctrine of appellate "affirm on any ground" has been applied in Utah
jurisprudence in many different types of situations. The doctrine has been applied
where the trial court made legal rulings on motions for summary judgment2 or
motions to dismiss.3 Other opinions have affirmed on alternate legal grounds when
the trial court findings established the factual foundation for the legal determination,4

1

828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

2

DeBry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995); Allphin Realty. Inc. v. Sine. 595
P.2d 860 (Utah 1979).
3

O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991).

4

Buhner Block Company v. BUWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah
1988) (interpretation of an integrated, non-ambiguous contract provision); Rice.
Melbv Enterprises. Inc. v. Salt Lake County. 646 P.2d 696, 698 & n. 3 (Utah
1982).
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the alternate ground for affirmance was "apparent in the record and was briefed and
argued by the parties on appeal,"5 or the appellate court had a "complete factual
record before [them], and defendants' arguments raise purely legal questions."6
The mainstay opinion used by the court of Appeals was Strollo v. Strollo.7
This was an opinion that ruled as a matter of law on uncontested factual allegations
in a complaint because the trial judge had granted a motion to dismiss the complaint.
As noted in Appellant Bayles' opening brief, because the court of appeals reinterpreted and applied alleged facts that were not found to be satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence by the trial before the trial court, (Opening Brief at
pages 7-11), affirming on alternate legal grounds when undisputed factual claims
are present does not apply to this case.
2. Re-Interpreting Factual Claims in Equitable Cases
When dealing vv'th equitable claims,
[i]t is true that in cases of equity this Court may weigh the evidence and
determine the facts. However, it is well established in our decisional
law that due to the advantaged position of the trial court, there is
indulged a presumption of correctness of the findings and judgment;
and that where the evidence may conflict we do not upset the lower
court's findings unless the evidence clearly preponderates against
them.8

5

Dipoma v. McPhie. 2001 UT 61 If 18, 426 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (2001).

6

Utah v. Finalvson. 2001 UT 10 If 31, 994 P.2d 1243 (2000).

7

828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

8

Ovard v. Cannon. 600 P.2d 1246,1248 (Utah 1979).
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It is inappropriate in most instances for an appellate court to disregard
the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and to assume
the task of weighing evidence and making its own findings of fact. The
appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity
and should defer to the trial court on factual matters. . . .In certain
instances, the appellate court may exercise equitable powers and take
upon itself the responsibility of weighing the evidence and making its
own findings of fact.. .However, this exception must not become merely
a guise under which an appellate court substitutes its own judgment for
that of the trial court. The appellate court must have a valid reason to
take this extraordinary step and then only when the appellate court is
in an equal position with the trial court with respect to the facts and
evidence at issue.9
The appellate court does
not engage in a review of the evidence which duplicates the task of the
trial court. Rather, we assess the quality and quantity of the evidence
to determine if it "clearly preponderates" against the trial court's finding
that the appropriate standard of proof has been satisfied.10
An appellate court is "not at liberty to reject the trial court's rulings only on the basis
of an unsubstantiated belief that the finding is inaccurate."11
The court of appeals has not established why its was necessary to take an
"extraordinary step" of re-weighing the evidence presented to the trial court,
especially when no claim was made by Appellee Bailey that the findings of fact of the
trial court were erroneous or lacking. Furthermore, since it claimed that it was

9

Willev v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226, 230-31 (Utah 1997).

10

Estate of Hock v. Zion's First National Bank. 655 P.2d 1111,1114 & n. 1
(Utah 1982) (emphasis in original.)
11

Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996).
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relying on "specific findings or undisputed evidence,"12 it can not claim the benefit of
making its own equitable findings.
3. Strollo v. Strollo13 Was Erroneously Applied
to Affirm the Trial Court
The majority panel of the court of appeals used the precedent of Strollo v.
Strollo to recast the trial court's findings of fact and the application of law to affirm
the trial court on alternate grounds. There is conflicting precedent regarding whether
or not an Appellee may raise "an argument in defense of the lower court's judgment
when the argument was not presented in the lower court".14 If this Court were to find
that the legal argument must have been raised in the lower court, the use of Strollo
v. Strollo to recast the facts and law in the case brought by Appellee Bailey was in
error because of the context in which it was raised in the trial court.
Strollo v. Strollo focused on whether or not a preliminary injunction should
have been issued under the Cohabitant Abuse Act.15 The case had been dismissed
because the trial judge had not found there to be "eminent harm" even though there
were allegations that the spouse had been beaten for eight and one-half years and
was in fear of further harm. The most recent abuse had occurred approximately

12

Bailey v.Bavles. 2001 UT App 34, K 10, 18 P.3d 1129 (2001).

13

828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

14

State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 355 & n.3 (1996); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d
145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
15

Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 to -11 (1989 & Supp 1991).
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eight months earlier and required the spouse to seek medical care and residence in
a shelter. Approximately one month before the filing, the spouse seeking relief had
been threatened with death if a divorce was sought. The trial court's denial of the
initial request was error because "[t]he statute clearly protects those who are
reasonably in fear of physical harm resulting from past conduct coupled with present
threat of future harm."16
For at least six reasons, the precedent of Strollo v. Strollo to re-frame facts
and legal issues. First, the Strollo case was appealed on the basis of a motion to
dismiss; hence, all allegations made had to be taken as being true. In this case, the
appeal arose from a hotly disputed trial in the context of determining whether or not
the already stipulated to preliminary order would be made permanent. Second, the
claimed urgency of needed physical protection - threatened death one month
previous - is absent. Both the original petition and argument of counsel indicated
that no physical abuse had occurred since 1994, five years before the trial.17 It was
uncontested that in the parties divorce proceeding, a mutual restraining order had
been lifted eleven months prior to the filing of the protective order.18 Third, no
evidence was ever alleged or introduced showed Appellant Bailey had been to any

16

Strollo v. Strollo. supra. 828 P.2d at 534-45.

17

Record 168 at page 466, lines 7-14 (Counsel for Appellant Bayles); page
496, line 24 - page 497, line 2 (Counsel for Appellee Bailey.)
18

Record 168, pg. 475, line 21 - page 476, line 8.
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shelter or medical treatment had been obtained by Appellee Bailey because of the
conduct of Appellant Bailey.19 Fourth, some 1991 of the out-of-state precedent relied
upon by the appellate court and Appellee Bailey in closing argument20 that defined
abuse as including acts that would cause another to be "worried, anxious, or
uncomfortable,"21 a doctrine that appears to be contrary to the precedent of Salt
Lake City v. Lopez22 and related precedent requiring that emotional stress be shown
by either physical symptoms or mental illness.23 Fifth, in closing argument, Appellee
Bailey presented Strollo v. Strollo in the context of the stalking statute and Salt Lake
City v. Lopez opinion. The argument was made that when there has been an
abusive marriage over time, the totality of the situation must be examined, likely
lending itself to a subjective rather than objective ("reasonable person") standard for
determining whether or not emotional distress occurred.24 Sixth, not only were no

19

"[T]he court did not find.. .that plaintiff [Bayles] suffered from more than
anxiety or annoyance, perhaps because plaintiff put on no objective evidence
thereof." Bailev v. Bavles. 2001 UT App 34, fl 27, 18 P.3d 1129, 1136 (Davis, J.,
dissenting.)
20

Record 168, page 480, lines 17-22.

21

See, In re Marriage of Blistein. 212 III. App. 3d 124, 155 III. Dec. 746, 569
N.E.2d 1357 (1991), cited in Strollo v. Strollo. supra, at 534 & n.2.
22

935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

23

Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co..858 P.2d 970, 973-75 (Utah 1993);
Record 168, at page 454, line 19 - page 455, line 19.
24

Record 168, page 479, line 11 - 486, line 20. Counsel for Appellee Bailey
indicated that the court of appeals was "saying look at everything, look at it in its
Page 7

"extraordinary circumstances" present to justify an equitable re-weighing of factual
matters before the trial court, the court of appeals was not in the same position of the
trial court judge who saw and observed the demeanor of witnesses and the quality
of other evidence submitted.25
B. The Justifications Offered By Appellee Bailey for Affirmance
By the Court of Appeals Are Without Merit
Based on the foregoing arguments and the reasons that follow, the first three
arguments raised in the Brief of Appellee Bailey must fail.

totality, and that way Strollo. I believe suggests that it's a subjective sort of
response or a subjective sort of standard."Jd., page 483, lines 2-5. However, it
was also argued "I think that the Court has to look at that in some sense - I
mean in some sense it is subjective and objective and I am (inaudible) the line, I
realize that, but the Court has to decide that in order to apply to Cohabitant
Abuse Act that there's some reasonableness to the person's fear. Because I
don't think the could be in a position that said "Okay, all you have to come in and
say is 'I'm afraid,' therefore you get this cohabitant abuse order on your side,"
because I think it would become unmanageable in many ways, this act has
become unmanageable and has been misused... .1 think it just becomes a
difficult question, so I don't think the line is so easy to draw on the objective and
subjective, and I realize I'm arguing inconsistently, but I don't think there's any
other choice in these types of cases, because the Court has to make a
determination." id., page 483, line 23 - page 485, line 2. The nature of fear in the
context of this case and State v. Lopez was also discussed, jd-, page 485, line
13 -page 487, line 7.
25

Willeyv.Willey. 951 P.2d 226, 230-31 (Utah 1997). ("The appellate court
must have a valid reason to take this extraordinary step and then only when the
appellate court is in an equal position with the trial court with respect to the facts
and evidence at issue.")
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1. Appellate Court Affirming on Non-found Factual Findings Must Fail
As noted above, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court by giving weight
and credibility to factual allegations in the petition that the trial court did not find were
proven. A stipulation that certain evidence may be admitted is not a stipulation that
it is accepted as being true; a trial court is to required to accept each piece of
evidence as a proven fact just because it receives a statement regarding the same.26
Contrary to the assertions of Appellant Bailey at page 12 of her brief, the issue is not
whether the limited findings of the trial court were contradicted by the court of
appeals novel findings of fact; rather, underWillevv. Willev. the issue is whether or
not (1) there existed extraordinary circumstances to merit such action and (2) the
appellate court was in the same position as the trial court to consider the evidence.
Had the appellate case been decided on summary judgment, a motion to dismiss,
stipulated facts, or sole'\ on the findings made by the trial court, there could be
possible justification for the action by the court of appeals. However, as there is not,
the use of facts not found by a trial court must fail.
On pages 11-12 of her brief, Appellant Bailey claims that the findings of
additional facts by the court of appeals was justified for at least three reasons. First,
both Appellee and Appellant were at fault for not objecting to the trial court over
insufficient findings of fact or asking for more specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Second, since both parties and the court "went off on a tangent
26

See Willev v. Willev. 951 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1997).
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about elements of the criminal stalking statute," it was proper for the court of appeals
to clarify what is required as a matter of law to prevail under the Cohabitant Abuse
Act. Third, being in a similar position to the trial court, its enlargement on factual
findings was not improper. Upon closer examination, all three arguments fail.
In a proceeding seeking to establish the factual basis for a permanent
protective order, the burden of proof is on the party seeking the injunction. A party
seeking a permanent injunction carries the burden of ensuring that adequate findings
of fact are made to justify a desired result legal conclusion. Especially when an
opposing party has argued thoroughly the legal standard to be applied at the trial
level, a failure of the trial court to find facts to support the same may be preserved
as a tactical matter for an appeal.
The parties and the trial court focused at trial and on appeal on the standards
of criminal stalking because that is the legal standard pled by Appellee Bailey in her
opening petition.
Finally, since the factual allegations of the petition were at issue and hotly
disputed at the trial court level,27 the appellate court could not have been in the same
position of the trial court as it related to weighing the credibility of the evidence and
the witnesses. Without this, making an equitable re-determination of facts was in
error.

27

See Record 168, page 455 at line 20 - page 477, line 24 (summary of
factual arguments presented by Counsel for Appellant Bayles.)
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2. Appellate Court Affirming on Non-contextual Legal Grounds Must Fail
Appellee Bailey argued Strollo v. Strollo was argued to the trial court to
define the nature of the "reasonableness of fear" as required by the criminal stalking
statute.28 At no time was Strollo v. Strollo used to argue at trial that the initial petition
should be accepted at face value as evidence of "domestic abuse" and the
permanent order issue. This leads to misuse of disputed evidence by the changing
of the legal context in which it is admitted. Justice Davis observed his concern as
follows:
Specifically, the majority's affirmance of the trial court relies on
evidence from the record, admitted in support of Bailey's claim, and
applies to a completely different claim. As a result, this court is
reshaping the relevance and importance of evidence that was
presented against Bayles by the earlier proceeding. Such an approach
is improper in the present case because, had Bayles been aware that
certain testimony was or would become determinative of the different
case decided by the court of appeals, his trial strategy and/or
arguments on appeal may have changed dramatically. Similarly, had
the trial court heard the case now decided by the court of appeals and
the evidence relied upon by the court of appeals in that context, its
findings, conclusions, and rulings may have been totally different... .1
am also troubled by the majority's reliance on instances on abuse that
allegedly occurred anywhere from four to twenty-five years before the
petition for a protective order was filed. While the trial court relied on
that evidence to support its conclusion relative to Bayles knowledge or
constructive knowledge, the majority, without any opportunity for the
parties or the trial court to address the issue, uses the evidence as
direct evidence of a substantively different type of domestic violence.29
28

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1999); State v. Lopez, supra. 935 P.2d
at 1264.
29

Bailev v. Bayles. 2001 UT App 34, fl 19 & n.5, 18 P.3d 1129 (Utah Ct. App.
2001) (Davis, J., dissenting.)
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3. The Trial Court Found Insufficient Factual Evidence
to Uphold the Elements of Stalking
For reasons noted in the dissent of Justice Davis and the opening brief of
Appellant Bayles, the factual findings of the trial court were insufficient to satisfy the
elements of the stalking statute.30
On page 14 of her brief, Appellee Bailey questions why "should anyone be
forced to endure stalking until her psychological being is seriously damaged to the
point where she needs psychological and/or medical intervention?" Overlooked are
the facts that (1) this proof was only necessary because the trial court rejected the
claim of Appellee Bailey that there was a reasonable fear of bodily harm and (2) the
evidentiary burden as to emotional distress was well-established in existing case law
that was specifically brought to the trial court's attention and addressed by counsel
for Appellee at the trial level.
While the majority panel of the court of appeals and Appellee Bailey may have
wished that the trial court had made additional or different findings of fact, making
statements of fact - even under oath - does not make them so as a matter of law
in the absence of a determination by a trier of fact that they are so. Because the
findings of fact of the trier of fact have failed to satisfy the statutory standard selected
by Appellee Bailey in formulating her request for a temporary and permanent

30

Bailey v. Bavles. supra, 2001 UT App 34, ffl| 25-28; Opening Brief of
Randee Bayles, Appellant, pages 12-14.
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protective order, a post-trial, post-appeal argument regarding the unfairness of the
legal standard must fail.
II. The Conduct of the Court of Appeals Has Violated the Right of
Appellant Bayles to Due Process of Law31
Appellee Bailey has correctly observed this Court has stated that the
application of the appellate rule that allows affirmance on any ground, even when a
trial court has relied on another ground, does "not deprive a party of due process."32
Nonetheless, sua sponte consideration of issues not raised in the trial court below
should be prohibited as a violation of due process.
In our judicial system, except in extraordinary circumstances which are
not present here, all parties are entitled to notice that a particular issue
is being considered by a court and an opportunity to present evidence
and argument on that issue before decision.33
"It has always been our policy to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have
their day in court on the merits of a controversy."34 "Because of these significant
constitutional concerns, the courts generally strongly disfavor sua sponte
consideration of arguments and issues not raised by either party, without the

31

No distinction is being made between the rights afforded by Article I § 7 of
the Utah Constitution and that afforded by the XIV Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
32

Debry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995).

33

Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990).

34

Celebrity Club Incorporated vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 657 P.2d
1293,1296 (Utah 1982).
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adversely affected party receiving notice and being allowed to respond."35 Not only
are federal and state constitutional due process rights at issue, but public policy
issues that favor a vibrant adversary system as a means of finding legal truth, the
reviewing role of appellate courts, and the requirements of various Rules of
Appellate Procedure are also denigrated if sua sponte consideration of issues not
raised on appeal are used to affirm a trial court's result after different factual findings
are made while applying the one's made in a different legal context.36
There does not appear to be any compelling or rational reason why the court
of appeals could not have asked for additional briefing on the applicability of the law
it chose to use or the correctness of the factual additions it made to the record. In the
absence of such, Appellant Bailey was denied due process of law by the lack of
procedures and means used by the majority of the court of appeals panel to issue
its ruling in this case.
III. The Conduct of the Court of Appeals Has Violated the Right of
Appellant Bayles to Due Course of Law
On page 16 of her brief, Appellee Bailey implies that the rights protected by
Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution are the same as those procedural rights
afforded by the due process Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution. This is in error.

35

Crook, D. Scott, "Affirming the Untested - Affirming a Trial Court on Issues
Raised Sua Sponte," 14 Utah State Bar Journal 10, 12-13 (October 2001), and
federal and state cases cited therein.
36

Id. at 13-15.
Page 14

Utah's Article I § 11 "open court" provisions guarantees "remedy by due
course of law" for a citizens' "person, property, or reputation".
The meaning of section 11 must be taken not only from its history and
plain language, but also from its functional relationship to other
constitutional provisions. Section 11 and the Due Process Clause of
Article I, Section 7 are related both in their historical origins and to
some extent in their constitutional functions. To a degree, the two
provisions are complementary and even overlap, but they are not
wholly duplicative. Both act to restrict the powers of both courts and the
Legislature.37
From the outset, this Court recognized that the requirements of Article I § 11 applied
to "judicial" acts;38 more recently, this phrase has been interpreted to "guarantee
access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equity."39
Application of this protections provided by this phrase "due course of law" to the
judiciary is in accordance with the initial inclusion of the provisions in early American
state constitutions to preserve an independent judiciary.40
In 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed a legislatively enacted ninety-day
time limit for filing a writ of habeas corpus under the provisions of Article I § 11. 41 The

37

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985).

38

Industrial Commission of Utah v. Evans. 52 Utah 394, 409,174 P. 825, 831
(1918).
39

Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234,1250 (Utah 1998). cert, denied 526 U.S.
1130, 119 S.Ct. 1803, 143 LEd.2d 1007 (1999).
40

See Hoffman, Jonathan, "By the Course of Law: The Origins of the Open
Courts Clause of the State Constitutions," 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279 (Winter, 1995).
41

Currier v.Holden. 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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Court of Appeals examined the effect of a ninety-day statute of limitations on filing the
writ of habeas corpus to determine "(1) the degree to which a statute impairs an
individual's rights to seek a remedy and (2) the nature of the right impaired."42 Having
found the rights impaired were expressly protected by provisions of the Utah
Constitution, the court of appeals found that the challenged conduct required "higher
scrutiny than minimal deferential review and demand more than a determination that
a statue does not represent a "case[] of extreme arbitrariness."43
In his opening brief, Appellant Bayles pointed out that the provisions of Article
VIII §§ 1 and 5 the Utah Constitution provide that district courts shall be "trial courts"
and have "original jurisdiction except as limited by the constitution or statute".
(Opening Brief at 18.) As these rights define the beginning point of the entire judicial
proceeding - a proceeding to be "based on fairness and equity" - a higher standard
than simple deference or presumption of constitutionality must be applied to the
conduct of the court of appeals in this case.
The court of appeals has not articulated a reason why it was required to
address issues in this appeal sua sponte, why it could enlarge on disputed facts to
create more factual findings, or why it applied a legal standard not disclosed in the
petition for relief or argued on appeal.

Without articulated justification, when

compared with the constitutional right to have evidence evaluated and decided by a
42

id- at 1363.

43

ld. at 1365.
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trial court, it is improper to presume that the conduct of the majority of the panel is
constitutional under Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution. Because the conduct of
the court of appeals regarding factual findings and applying legal argument in a
context was made when it was never argued or decided before the trial court,44
(regardless of whether the court of appeals had requested argument before it acted
sua sponte,) the court of appeals acted unreasonably when its conduct is juxtaposed
against the requirements of "due course of law" and the protections afforded those
citizens receiving a trial court under Article VIII §§ 1 and 5 of the Utah Constitution.
Conclusion
Legal and equitable precedent allowing affirmance of a trail court's action on
"any ground" do not apply to this case. Affirmance on legal grounds when there is no
conflict in facts does not apply to this case. Affirmance on a re-interpretation of facts
in a case of equity does not apply because the court of appeals claimed they were
relying on facts that were undisputed or found by the trial court. The precedent of
Strollo v. Strollo was misapplied to this case fora number of reasons.
Justifications offered by Appellee Bailey for the conduct of the court of appeals
must fail. The finding of alternate, supplementary facts fails when there has been no

44

Even if it was presumed that the granting of a preliminary injunction was
based on the court of appeals' newly found factual and legal claims, the
substitution of any such analysis with the final findings of fact and conclusions
would obviate the ability to use what was interpreted by appellate justices as
being a finding by the trial court. See Smith v. DeNiro. 25 Utah2d 294, 296, 480
P.2d480, 481 (1971).
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showing of an "extraordinary" circumstances to merit such an action or that the court
of appeals could evaluate the (disputed) evidence as did the trial court. While the
precedent of Strollo v. Strollo was used in one context of legal argument in the trial
court, the appellate court applied the legal precedent in a completely different legal
context, which in turn gave a different emphasis and cast to evidence found and that
submitted in the trial court. Under these facts, no legal argument (as used by the
Court of Appeals) was made. Finally, the findings of the trial court do not adequately
demonstrate under statutory requirements and existing case law that Appellant
Bayles engaged in stalking Appellee Bailey.
The sua sponte conduct of the court of appeals - without notice to either of the
parties on appeal - denied Appellant Bayles his right to due process of law under the
Utah and United States Constitution. There were no extraordinary conditions that
justified refusing to allow the parties to comment on new factual findings and legal
arguments made by the court of appeals that neither party made in the trial court or
to the court of appeals. To allow the same not only violates constitutional due
process provisions, but denigrates judicial policies favoring a strong adversary
system, the reviewing role of appellate courts, and the requirements of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Even if the court of appeals had given notice to the parties of its intended
course of action and asked for supplemental briefing, the rights of Appellant Bailey
to "due course of law" under Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution would have been
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denied. Article VIII §§ 1 and 5 of the Utah Constitution protect the original jurisdiction
of a district courts, a "trial court," except as limited by the constitution or statute.
Applying the provisions of Article I § 11 to create a judicial procedure based on
"fairness and equity," requires at least a higher scrutiny than minimal review when
judicial conduct interferes with a citizen's right to protect his "person, property, or
reputation" in state courts. No rationale was provided by the court of appeals to
infringe on the rights of Appellant Bayles; hence, the reasonableness of the conduct
must fail. By failing, the affirming conduct of the court of appeals violated Article I §
11 must be struck down.
Because the trial court's decision failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for
stalking, and the court of appeals' affirmance of the same must be struck down, the
granting of a permanent protective order against Appellant Bayles must be reversed.
DATED and EXECUTED this 3rd day of December, 2001.

Matthew Hilton of Matthew Hilton, P.C.
Attorney for Randy Bayles, Appellant
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